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Michael Weinman
*
Philip S. Horky’s Plato and Pythagoreanism is both 
deeply insightful and actually pleasant to read. 
According to the way it presents itself, his work 
is meant chiefly to offer two things. First, he 
means to defend a controversial thesis that offers 
a perspective on the role mathematics played in 
the development of Plato’s philosophy that dif-
fers meaningfully from the commonly accepted 
view of this matter. Second, he means to do so 
through a comprehensive analysis of the earliest 
philosophical, historical, and literary evidence 
concerning Pythagoreanism.
It is clear that in both respects, it is a great 
success. My aim here is to point out some of the ways 
in which it succeeds. The majority of what follows is 
my best shot at a simple excursus through many of 
the central claims of the work—though, for reasons 
that will emerge, I focus on the first, second, and 
sixth of his chapters because this seems to me to 
allow me to do the best job I can of doing some 
justice to his central, and as he notes, controversial 
thesis on “the role mathematics played in the deve-
lopment of Plato’s philosophy,” without getting too 
lost in the very learned and very interesting thickets 
of his “comprehensive analysis” of all the relevant 
sources. Also, if we are honest, what discussion of 
Pythagoreanism wants to get caught up in chapters 
* Bard College, Berlin.
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not presented here 
that are to him the 
most important. 
I leave it to his 
readers—who will be 
many—to decide for 
themselves.
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The central feature in Horky’s account is what 
he (and obviously not only he) calls “mathemati-
cal” Pythagoreanism; the “obviously not only he” 
modifier is a reference to the tradition—dating 
back to Aristotle—to divide Pythagoreans between 
the acousmatic and the mathematical, the ones 
who hear (only) certain things, and the one who 
attend to a certain kind of technical knowledge that 
relates to the features of numbers, and especially 
to small whole-number ratios. Fair enough. What 
is novel—and challenging—in Horky’s picture is, 
first, the precise way in which he characterizes 
what makes the mathematical Pythagoreans the 
mathematical Pythagoreans, and, second, the way in 
which he attempts to establish his view that “Plato 
inherits mathematical Pythagorean method only to 
transform it into a powerful philosophical argument 
concerning the essential relationships between the 
cosmos and the human being.”
My version of the “big picture” of Horky’s 
argument comes fairly into focus just from the titles 
of the three chapters on which I focus; namely: (1) 
Aristotle on Mathematical Pythagoreanism in the 
4th Century BCE; (2) Hippasus of Metapontum and 
Mathematical Pythagoreanism; (3) [ch.6] The Me-
thod of the Gods: Mathematical Pythagoreanism and 
Discovery. As we can see from this, the first thing we 
need to do, in order to take in Horky’s main claim, is 
to achieve the proper (i.e., critical) understanding 
of Aristotle’s version of what is meant by the cate-
gory “mathematical Pythagoreanism”; in so doing, 
Horky will work closely with the findings of Burkert, 
Huffman, and most recently Cornelli, in order to 
expound on the grounds of Aristotle’s distinction 
between the two kinds of Pythagoreans and also 
point toward what Aristotle might not have entirely 
grasped about them. Chiefly relevant in this is the 
proper understanding of the role of Hippasus, to 
which Horky devotes chapter 2, and through whom 
he wants to bring out his own understanding of ma-
thematical Pythagoreanism. The following chapters 
then show how this mathematical Pythagoreanism 
both manifests itself in Plato’s philosophy, and is 
put to work (appropriated) by Plato in order to dis-
cover and bring to light something that transcends 
the level of perspicacity that figures like Hippasus, 
Empedocles, Philolaus, and Archytas had achieved. 
This last part of the story is not re-capitulated here, 
but I believe my summary of how the findings of 
the first two “legs” of the race are deployed in the 
final longer leg will all same convey the sense of 
how Horky’s two main goals are met in this book.
So, first, Aristotle and mathematical Pythago-
reanism. Here, Horky basically wants us to believe 
a few things, none of which requires us to deviate 
very far from what seems to me a consensus about 
the subject matter of this chapter that has emerged 
over the past generation and a half. Namely, we are 
to begin with a more or less trusting belief in the 
evidence Aristotle provides for a distinction betwe-
en mathematical and acousmatic Pythagoreans. Na-
mely, these are distinguished by their methodology: 
mathematical Pythagoreans employ mathematical 
sciences to explain the “reason why” they hold their 
philosophical position, whereas acousmatic’s “appe-
al to basic, empirically derived fact (3).” Further, 
Aristotle says, we should hold that the demonstra-
tions of mathematical Pythagoreans represent an 
innovation over “facts” of acousmatic Pythagoreans. 
Philolaus’ fragments provide further evidence in 
analysing these claims regarding mathematical 
Pythagoreans and Aristotle.  All the same, Horky, 
here in a manner similar to Cornelli (2013), wants 
to investigate a different tradition than the one 
set down by Aristotle and not just take Aristotle’s 
definitions of acousmatics and mathematicians for 
granted.  In Horky’s (2013: 5) words: “Indeed, the 
primary criterion for distinguishing acousmatic from 
mathematical Pythagoreans, as I will show, is each 
group’s pragmateia (πραγματεία), a term that 
must be further contextualized in order to make 
sense of precisely how Aristotle draws the line (5).”
What do we find when (in the context of 
“Aristotle and mathematical Pythagoreanism”) we 
deepen our account through a careful consideration 
of pragma? Perhaps most importantly, Horky’s con-
clusion that Iamblichus is referring to Pythagoreans 
in general in his fragment on the question ‘what 
is to be done’, rather than mathematical/acous-
matic factions. Horky also provides three reasons 
for why he thinks Iamblichus’ passage applies to 
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Pythagoreans in general: because he does not use 
a conjunction to separate the groups here (where 
he has previously); the two groups shared religious 
precepts; the passage is repeated later to apply to 
all Pythagoreans. This matters because it shows 
that whatever divides these two groups it cannot 
simply be (as Burkert had it) that the mathematical 
Pythagoreans were the scientists/theorists and the 
acousmatic were practical/political. For Horky, the 
complaint recorded by Iamblichus actually presents 
Aristotle’s criticism of “the activities of the mathe-
matical Pythagorean Archytas of Tarentum (32).” 
What we primarily take home from this version 
of “mathematical Pythagoreanism” through the 
eyes of Aristotle, according to Horky, is that the 
for Aristotle, the fundamental difference between 
acousmatics and mathematical Pythagoreans was 
how the latter used demonstrative argumentation. 
Additionally, we should bear in mind how the 
mathematical Pythagoreans would also establish 
similarities between number and perceptibles, as 
well as an ontological order that was closely related 
to the social order of the polis. (This view of politics 
is discussed further, especially in chapters 3-5, not 
discussed in detail here.)
The crucial role of Hippasus in bringing 
us from mathematical Pythagoreanism as we en-
counter it through Aristotle and the mathematical 
Pythagoreanism that motivated Plato emanates 
from Hippasus’s importance for Horky’s continuing 
enquiry into the pragmateia of the mathematical 
Pythagoreans. Understanding Hippasus (or at least 
what middle-Platonists attributed to him, as we 
cannot always hope to disentangle the two) helps 
us to see “how metaphysics could have been brought 
to bear on religion and politics in the mathematical 
Pythagorean pragmateia (38).” In trying to figure 
out the genuine place of Hippasus (and Philolaus 
and Archytas) in this development, Horky discusses 
two sets of sources for his enquiry: the Platonists 
of the early academy (following Plato’s death in 
347 BCE) and Aristotle’s associates at the Lyceum, 
Theophrastus and Aristoxenus. Theophrastus is 
listed as an especially important source for two 
reasons: firstly, because his knowledge of Pythago-
reans was informed by Platonic teachers and not 
Aristotle’s skewed vision, and secondly because his 
“doxographical” works also reveal important differ-
ences with Aristotle. Aristoxenus, meanwhile, is also 
important because the fragments that survive of his 
work on Pythagoreanism reveal a deep engagement 
with the tradition. 
Horky is interested in comparing Aristoxenus’ 
idea of “aiming at the divine” and Aristotle’s idea 
of ordering the universe according to what is more 
honourable, using  Wehrli, F23 in this analysis. Horky 
(2013: 46) concludes his analysis of the fragment 
by saying: “this fragment evidences Aristoxenus’s 
interest to explain a Pythagorean axiology of the 
“honorable” by appeal to strategies of assimilation 
between numbers and things.” This conclusion, he 
asserts, is important for two reasons, what is says 
about the “first principles” themselves, and how 
these first principles are both ontological and a 
principle of military and household rule. For Horky, 
the principle that the ἀρχή is a “most honorable” 
thing” is originally a product of Platonic thought and 
was systematized in Aristotle; it is drawn from sour-
ces in mathematical Pythagoreanism, but is original 
to Plato. Horky provides a long list of places in the 
dialogues where “honourable” appears, including the 
Timaeus, to show that Plato was aware of and using 
this concept.  He then argues that the combination 
of what is “better” with what is “honourable” is a 
recurring topos in Aristotle’s writing and that this 
raises the view that arguments that involve the 
metaphysics of the honourable, and attributed to 
the Pythagoreans by Aristoxenus, may in fact be 
Aristotealian in origin. He concludes this section 
with a discussion of how there is no reference to 
axiological uses of the honourable in genuine frag-
ments of mathematical Pythagoreans like Philolaus 
and Archytas, and how this fact complicates his 
interpretation.
The remainder of this chapter surveys the 
many, conflicting views put forth about Hippa-
sus—both those of the specialists of the past two 
generations, and those of the tradition, from the 
Academy and Lyceum through the Hellenic and 
medieval periods—concluding with Xenocrates of 
Chalcedon, whose doctrines bare striking resem-
blance to those of Hippasus. Horky’s goal is to show 
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that the Early Platonists wrote about Hippasus and 
assimilated Hippasus’ doctrine to Pythagorean ide-
als. Horky’s (2013: 77) specific suggestion is that 
Xenocrates might have considered the “Forms” as 
“paradigms,” which would not be a major innova-
tion since “a strong association of these concepts 
follows almost naturally from a reading of Plato’s 
Timaeus, and more important, it might have already 
been circulating in the Early Academy after Plato’s 
death.” On this basis, Horky returns to a discussion 
of Aristotle’s views of the Pythagoreans, where he 
concludes that Aristotle is the source of the claim 
that Hippasus is a natural philosopher as well as 
the source of the claim that Hippasus was the pro-
genitor of the ‘mathematical’ school within Pytha-
goreanism. Aristoxenus, Horky believes, takes over 
from Aristotle the focus on what is “honourable” in 
Pythagoreanism and that the doctrine ascribed to 
Hippasus, that he believed that “Soul-number is the 
first paradigm of the making of the world,” is owed 
to Speusippus’s or possibly Xenocrates’s writings on 
the Pythagoreans, in an attempt to align Hippasus’s 
supposed ancient doctrine with their own (which, 
subsequently, has been derived in various fashions 
from Plato’s Timaeus).”
Which brings us, again leaving to the side for 
the moment a treasure of threads worth retracing 
that are found in chapters three through five—
and let me point specifically among them Horky’s 
treatment of the two classes, “what is” (τί ἔστι), 
“what is to the greatest degree” (τί μάλιστα), 
as “forming the background for Plato’s dialectical 
response to Pythagoreanism,”discussed at length in 
chapters 4 and 5—to the question Horky tries to 
answer in chapter 6: how did Plato advance beyond 
mathematical Pythagoreanism? His answer involves 
Plato’s use of what Horky (2013: 201) calls Plato’s 
“first-discoverer myths” (of Prometheus, Palamedes, 
and Theuth), which are used by Plato to explore the 
methods of inquiry of the mathematical Pythagore-
ans, and which “allow him to attack the positions of 
his contemporary intellectual competitors without 
naming them (201).” Horky distinguishes between 
two periods in Plato’s dialogues utilizing the “first-
-discoverer” myths, and naturally we will focus on 
the second, later period which includes the Timaeus. 
(The early period, not further discussed here, 
deals with problems of mathematics and writing, 
as relevant to the pursuance of the Good.) Horky 
(2013: 202) believes that with the later-period 
“first-discoverer” myths, “Plato demonstrates a 
reevaluation of what empirical science—especially 
that employed by the mathematical Pythagoreans 
in their approaches to harmonic theory—could offer 
to his own approaches to cosmogony, metaphysics, 
and dialectic.” Horky will try to answer his question 
by means of showing what the proper interpretation 
of the “first-discoverer” tradition teaches us about 
Plato’s critical response to the Pythagoreans. He 
does so by interpreting the place of the figures of 
Palamedes, Prometheus, and Theuth in the Protago-
ras, Republic, and Phaedrus.
Horky proceeds by addressing the “heurema-
tographical topos” in these dialogues. Horky adopts 
the term “heuromatography” from Zhmud (2006) 
and it means: “the surviving written treatments 
of various “elements of culture as discoveries 
(εὑρήματα)” made by certain “first discoverers 
(πρῶτοι εὑρεταί),” whether divine or human.” 
Though of immense interest, I pass over the discus-
sion of Protagoras and Phaedrus, to conclude with 
Horky’s presentation of, as his subject heading has 
it, “mathematical pythagoreans and the musical 
dialectics in the Timaeus and Philebus.” 
With respect to Philebus, Horky (2013: 252) 
works with the basic binary opposition between 
quantity and quality in the intervals with regard to 
‘number,’ introduced at 17c11-e3, finding that it is 
“difficult to know for sure whether Plato intended 
pitch height or depth to be numerically quanti-
fiable, if indeed this is the right way to read this 
passage.” Horky’s claim is that the Timeaus offers a 
‘third way’ between two interpretive responses here. 
Namely, that the number of notes is in fact limited 
quantitively because it is shown to repeat (252). 
Horky (2013: 254) this way: “It is pretty clear that 
Plato’s description of the generation of a complex 
entity such as “health” or “music” that is made up 
of a factor that limits the unlimited in the Philebus 
is coordinate with other late presentations of the 
cosmic generation of entities marked by the quali-
ties of being concordant and symmetrical, especially 
desígnio 13 
169 
jul/dez 2014
what is found in Plato’s Timaeus.” Horky (2013: 
255) here cites what he calls the “dialectical tenor” 
of Timaeus’s description (at 80b2-8, translation is 
Horky’s following Barker 1989) of συμφωνίαι in 
which slower sounds “catch up [to swifter sounds] 
they do not disturb their motion by imparting a di-
fferent one…[but]…by attaching [to one another] 
in a similarity [ὁμοιότητα προσάψαντες], they 
are blended together into a single effect, derived 
from the high and the low [μίαν ἐξ ὀξείας καὶ 
βαρείας συνεκεράσαντο πάθην]. Hence they 
provide pleasure to people of poor understanding, 
and delight to those of good understanding, be-
cause of the imitation of the divine harmonia that 
comes into being in mortal movements.”
For Horky (2013: 256), and following Barker, 
“the Demiurge’s activity of division is based on the 
classification of means and proportions advanced 
by Archytas in Fragment 2.189. It remains only a 
speculation, but we can nevertheless see Hippa-
sus of Metapontum hiding in the background of 
Archytas’s classification, informing both Archytas’s 
approaches to music theory and Plato’s approaches 
to generation of the world-soul.” This then mani-
fests in the spatiotemporal “pause”, by which Horky 
(2013: 256) means “the assimilation of one thing 
to another that had previously been different, or 
alternatively to the placing of things in opposition 
in a relationship of concordance (256).” This pause 
occurs in dialectical relationships as well as physics 
and metaphysics, which Horky relates to Plato’s the-
orizing about the “monochord”. Here Horky (2013: 
258) makes fascinating use of Mitchell Miller’s claim 
that Plato is thinking of the so-called ‘Dorian mode’ 
(when in Tim 35b4-36b6 the Demiurge dividing 
universe with Pythagorean ratios) in order to show 
that if a two-octave stretch of string were divided 
in such a way the seven-notes of the octave would 
be repeated once, there would thus be a repeating 
order in the continuum. For Horky (2013: 258), Plato 
could thus describe this as a limit on the unlimited 
continuum: “Plato might describe this activity as 
bringing a limit based in “due measure” to bear on 
what is otherwise unlimited, the continuum that 
lacks proper measurement and is thereby neither 
“commensurate” nor “concordant” without it. 
Dialectic, cosmology, and metaphysics are thus 
understood in Plato’s Timaeus and Philebus to con-
form to the rules of mathematics, both harmonic 
and calculative, and are understood to be informed 
by empirical observation. (258)”
Here—in this final conclusion about dialectic, 
cosmology and metaphysics are seen as both the 
result of a calculative and harmonic and informed 
by empirical observation—we see the singular value 
of both Horky’s “controversial thesis” about Plato 
as an inheritor and extender of the tradition of ma-
thematical Pythagoreanism and his “comprehensive 
analysis” of the all the sources for that tradition, 
both antedating and postdating Plato. In its com-
prehensiveness and its precision, this concluding 
claim seems to me emblematic of the success of 
Horky’s work, and why it will be a standard text for 
those interested in Plato and in Pythagoreanism , 
and especially for those of us interested in their 
interconnection.
Recebido em abril de 2014, 
aprovado em junho de 2014.
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